Why we need the Emotions: Understanding the Passions and Saint Paul in Light of Thomas Aquinas
Ian S. Masson
The Institute for the Psychological Sciences
Our Need for the Emotions
One has only to look at the world to see that man has a multitude of evils and conflicts raging against him, from physical evils to struggles that dwell within him. One issue that appears to be of a particularly troublesome nature is the passions, or emotions, of man. In man’s pursuit of beatitude the passions can be a rather thorny issue for him, as they have the potential to pull him away from true beatitude and ultimate good, which are God (Gondreau, 2007, p.431). This struggle is not new for man, for even Saint Paul in frustration laments in his letter to the Romans that “I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do” (RSV, Rom 7:19). In light of this portrayal of the emotions, it might appear better that one merely denies the emotions and subdue them by force of will. However, an investigation into Scripture and the teachings of the Catholic Church show that this is not the case. Looking at the teachings of Thomas Aquinas on the passions and the example Jesus Christ presents in Scripture, it becomes evident that passions are necessary for man to develop in his moral life. In addition, when brought in line with a rightly formed intellect and will and a life of virtue, the passions aid man in pulling him towards what is the ultimate good. This conception of the emotions will give not only a deeper understanding of Saint Paul and his struggle, but will also shed light on the psychology of emotions and why they are necessary for man in his journey towards the ultimate good.
Understandings of the Emotions
There have been many different schools of thoughts offering various opinions on the nature of the emotions. The term ‘emotion’ in its current use is rather narrow, and Aquinas’ use of passion both includes and surpasses it. In addition, when Aquinas speaks of passions he is not referring to the narrow definition of passions to mean “a violent sentiment that overpowers reason” (Pinckaers 1990, p. 274). Aquinas uses passion to denote not only emotions and feelings but also “sense knowledge of the world and its actors, and to the potential to be hurt, hungry, and thirsty, as well as to suffer death” (Titus 2009, p. 57). Passions do not only include emotions such as desire, love, and joy, but also sense knowledge that occurs prediscursively, enabling a type of precursory evaluation (CCC #1763). For Aquinas, the passions are sensate movements of the soul that either draw one towards some perceived good or make him recoil from a perceived evil. These sensate movements, in Latin passio, for the purposes of this paper will be referred to interchangeably as “emotions” and “passions” as previous works have done (Gondreau, 2007, p. 422). Regardless of the term used, emotion or passion, this still leaves one the question as to their nature: Are passions by nature irrational and evil and therefore should be subdued or does man need them in some fashion?
Irrational Passions
At first glance it would appear that these movements based on man’s senses are very much irrational. In Saint Paul’s frustrated cry against doing the evil he does not want to do, he clearly states that he wants to do the good However, he experiences a “war among my members”, a war with will and intellect on one side and passions on the other (Rom 7:19-24). Paul both knows what is good and desires to do it, but experiences a pull of the flesh towards lesser goods, a spiritual tug of war between appetites termed “concupiscence” (Gondreau, p. 431). Because his passions keep him from a life of virtue and true beatitude, one could possibly look at the passions as something evil. It was the belief of the Stoics that the passions would “cloud our judgment and… hamper our duty” and that “the goal of moral life is apatheia, indifference to one’s emotional states” (Gondreau, p. 443). What this does is set up a sort of dualism, where intellect and will are fighting against the passions of the flesh, which are impediments to man’s freedom in seeking the good. Looking at the passage in Romans, it is clear that the passions are acting as a chain to Saint Paul, wanting to do the good with all his good but failing because of the passions of his flesh. Because of this clear effect of sin on the human passions in hindering man from achieving true beatitude, even many Christians have often pushed passions to the irrational sphere as obstacles to be avoided. For many, the belief developed that virtue and beatitude can only be obtained through an act of the will, a belief held even by some of Aquinas’ contemporaries such as Bonaventure, who viewed the passions as “a hindrance to the spiritual ascent of the soul towards union with the One” (Gondreau, p.443).
Another philosopher who did not believe there could be any communication between reason and the sensate movements was Descartes. He conceives of the passions as movements produced by the mechanical workings of the body, caused by the corporeal part of man, various organs and structures of the brain. There is for Descartes a clear separation between man’s rational thoughts and his emotions, revealing again a very dualistic line of thought. For him, the passions belong exclusively to the body and therefore cannot point in any way to rational knowledge or true human good since they are not truly of the mind. Therefore, man must avoid the passions in order to pursue rational knowledge and to develop mastery of free will (Pinckaers, p.280). Rational knowledge then can be used to reign in these animal passions and keep them in check, regardless of what they incline one to do (Gondreau, p. 445). Therefore, what Paul must do is very similar to the Stoic line of thought. While Descartes does not necessarily believe that Paul should not feel emotions at all or should be indifferent to them, he must develop his reason to the point where he can harness his animal senses and hold them in check.
Passions: The Highest Good
On the other side of the coin is the perspective that views the passions as the highest good, an extreme view held by the Epicureans (Gondreau, p.446). Here instead of reigning in the passions with reason one should hand the reigns to passion and let passion guide. A life of moral excellence consists not in choosing the highest good like Bonaventure believed, but consists instead of pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain. For the Epicureans, according to Pinckaers, “beatitude is placed at the level of the emotions”, meaning pleasure is the highest good possible and pain is something to be avoided at all costs (Pinckaers, p.275). David Hume later developed a similar view, believing that ‘virtue’ and ‘vice’ were not objective actions but merely subjective statements of feeling. Moral judgments do not really exist, for when one makes a statement about ‘virtue’ one means something that brings pleasure, whereas ‘vice’ brings pain (Gondreau, p.447-448). One therefore must pursue what is pleasurable in life and avoid that which causes pain if one is interested in living the good life.
If Saint Paul adopted this line of thinking, it would provide him with an interesting conundrum because he laments about how his passions pull him, but according to this understanding he should merely follow his passions. Based on the Epicurean line of thought, Paul is creating a conflict where one needn’t exist. He should not be fighting against that which would bring him pleasure, but instead should embrace it as his highest good. Hume would view the problem in the sense that when Paul uses the terms ‘good’ or ‘evil’ he is merely referring to his subjective feelings, what he does or doesn’t like. Again, instead of fighting against this Paul should instead embrace what feels to him subjectively ‘good’.
A Need for Something More
Both of the above views bring something positive to the table and at the same time leave something important out. While those like Bonaventure and the Stoics have a fair point that the emotions often run counter to man’s reason and will, the fact that the swing to the extreme of marginalizing emotions cuts out an integral part of man who, as Pope Benedict XVI says, is both body and soul united as one (2006, n. 5). Without the emotions, man becomes something less than what he was meant to be. If God created man in his image and likeness, then God must have given the emotions to man for a specific reason (Genesis 1:26-28). Trying to cut out the emotions would be like trying to cut out any of man’s other faculties: his need to sleep, eat, even intangible needs like the need for relationship. Doing this would cut out part of what makes man human and in doing so deprives him of the passions which he needs, a fact which will be revealed presently.
On the other side, the Epicureans are right in the sense that passions can point to what is good. It is the role of the passions to move man towards a perceived bodily good or away from a bodily evil (Gondreau, p.424). These perceived goods and evils aid man in his ability to live, whether because of hunger he eats, because of a desire for relationship he takes a wife, or out of fear he recoils from a dangerous object. The passions point man to objects that are indeed very good and are necessary for his survival, since again he is both body and soul united, both parts requiring that their needs be fulfilled. However, this line of thought does not account for the very real struggle that is occurring inside of Paul. He knows there is objective good and evil regardless of how his body subjectively feels, something the Church has never failed to teach (CCC, #1958). The Epicurean understanding does not allow for the fact that man is a fallen being and as such his intellect and sense appetites rarely work in harmony, but instead pull him in different directions (Gondreau, p.431). Despite the fact that his passions may be indulged, Paul spiritually feels that he is doing evil, which he does not want to do, and is not doing the good which he does want to do. This points to a pleasure that is beyond the sensate appetites, which by themselves are obviously not fulfilling enough for Paul. Since he is both body and soul, it is not sufficient for him to indulge his passions without care for his soul, which also longs to have its need of true beatitude in God fulfilled. If Epicureans give too much control to the passions and the Stoics do not give enough, is there a middle road where passions can work hand in hand with the intellect and will in man’s quest for true beatitude?
Passions: Part of the Whole
There is indeed a middle understanding in the man’s use of the passions, an understanding most fully developed by Thomas Aquinas. Both of the above understandings would prove unsatisfactory to Aquinas, the Cartesian dualism providing a “disembodied anthropology” and the Epicurean understanding not realizing that true beatitude, a life of virtue in God, stems not from emotion but from human rationality and will (Gondreau, p.423, 435). These views have split man in half, body and soul, when these parts are supposed to be intimately united so that man may be fully himself (Pope Benedict XVI, n. 5). The union of body and soul are so complete that “the soul cannot operate without the body… the life of the body must be sustained if the soul, even in the operation of its rational or spiritual powers, is to act, let alone flourish” (Gondreau, p.425). Man’s body and soul are so united that it is impossible to really separate them into different parts that have entirely different goals. Therefore, in the Thomistic understanding the passions form part of the larger whole of man, who has both passions, reason, and will. These parts may be different in how they operate, but they still have the capacity to work together to bring man to beatitude. Aquinas’ view is captured in Dr. Gondreau’s work on Aquinas’ understanding of the passions, where it is seen that passions work with the higher appetites of reason and will.
Reason and will can incite movements of passion, just as movements of emotion can rouse the will and influence a judgment of reason. Our passions and desires often shape how we think, thereby influencing how we act. For Aquinas, this offers plain evidence of the fact that the lower appetitive ordering to goods of the body truly participates in the higher appetitive ordering to happiness and fulfillment, to goodness itself (Gondreau, p.425).
What this passage shows is that man is not a soul that is working towards one good and a body that is working towards an entirely different good. Instead, the lower appetites, the passions can be ordered in such a way as to aid in bringing man to true beatitude. While man must use reason and will to strive towards ultimate happiness, at the same time he is made to be moved from within by his lower appetites to the gain of beatitude (Gondreau, p.430). This means that instead of remaining at the sensate level, the passions are able to move man to higher spiritual and moral levels (Pinckaers, p.277). While Aquinas realizes that man can choose the good without necessarily having the emotions present, such as in the case of Saint Paul, a morally perfect person would not have to work against his desires, but instead his desires would be in line with what he knew what the good was. He would see what was good, desire it, and choose it (Gondreau, 436), because his bodily, sensate appetites are working in harmony with his higher appetites, his will and intellect, to obtain the good.
The Passions at War
If the emotions indeed are part of man as an integrated whole, then why is there this violent struggle waging inside Saint Paul? After reading the passage in Romans, it would appear that the passions are anything but integrated and that they only serve to pull Paul (and man) away from what is truly good (Rom 7:17-24). As Dr. Gondreau’s analysis shows, Thomas was fully aware that the intellectual and sensual longings rarely work together in harmony for the purpose of obtaining true happiness (Gondreau, p.431). There are indeed competing pulls of the lower appetites towards bodily goods and those of higher appetites towards the highest good. However, this is due not in fact to the nature of emotions, but instead due to the concupiscence that is present in man. The effect of original sin has been such that there is now turmoil between man’s intellect and will and his sensate appetites. Whereas prior to the fall the lower powers worked in harmony with the higher and were subject to them, this is no longer the case (Titus, p.69). Now man’s reason and will have only a limited control over the sensate appetites, which must give their consent when the will makes a judgment about some perceived good, a relationship known as principatus politicus, where the passions are like free subjects who consent to be ruled by a higher power, but can withdrawn their consent at the same time (Gondreau, p. 432, 434). This means that, in some cases, the passions will not consent to a certain act even if the intellect knows it to be good and the will desires it. In such a scenario, if the sensate appetite is strong enough then it is possible for the person to be pulled towards a bodily good but not the highest good, something Saint Paul experienced.
Just because the passions are in some ways at war with the higher appetites does not mean they are themselves evil or irrational. Using the concept of the principatus politicus, one can see that the passions can actually participate with the higher powers of reason and will semi-autonomously, giving its consent to things it desires (Gondreau, p. 434). Because of this participation, the passions can serve as a source of virtuous behavior if they are directed in such a way to desire virtue, to desire the good. While not rational in and of themselves, the passions can become “rational by participation” with a rightly formed intellect and will oriented towards the good (Gondreau, p.434-435). Although this may seem absurd at first, as the passions flow from the animal senses of man and virtue is something that the intellect and will judge to be good, it actually shows how man can be oriented as a united being, passions, intellect, and will, towards the good. When this occurs, “sensation is perfected by serving the spirit, with the aid of the virtues that educate it” (Pinckaers, p.278). Aquinas understands this to occur through the formation of habits and virtue, as Dr. Gondreau points out.
“Through growth in moral virtue, the lower sense appetite advances from a power that contests reason and wills power to command to one that cooperates more and more, through it’s own impulses, with this imperium” (p.441).
As man grows in virtue, his passions will no longer conflict with him as to what good he should choose. His virtuous habits are formed in such a way that his whole integrated being, including his passions, become oriented towards what is rationally good and true beatitude. In this way man’s freedom of will is truly perfected, because now instead of his passions working as a chain keeping him from the true good they now work with his will to make him more inclined and desirous towards the good. His passions act in harmony with his reason and will, pulling him towards what is truly good for him as opposed to his choosing the good through a strict act of the will.
Necessary Use of Emotions
Man’s Need for Emotions
Even given the fact that the passions can participate with reason and will, is it really necessary that they do so? Why cannot one merely ignore the emotions and use the intellect and will to both recognize and choose the good? While this is possible, there are several reasons why bringing the passions into line with reason and will is more desirable than the alternative of ignoring them.
As has already been stated, the body and its passions are an integral part of what makes up man. To deny the passions or to regulate them to only necessary for the animal part of man is to deny the unity that Aquinas understands to exist between man’s body and his soul (Pinckaers, p.278). While both Aquinas and the Church realize that the passions themselves are morally neutral, only good insofar as the point man towards true good, this does not mean that one can choose to not engage the passions (CCC # 1767). Because the passions exist and because man was made body and soul in God’s image for God, the passions must exist in to pull man towards God in some way (Genesis 1: 26-28, 1Cor 6:19-20). God did not merely give man a soul but both a soul and body, meaning to deny part of the whole, in this case the body’s passions, is to deny part of God’s gift.
Not using the passions does not merely deny part of man, but it also could hinder him in his development as a person, both in terms of self-mastery and as a moral being. In the former, man, because he is body and soul, must come to master his emotions if he is to be more than an animal (Gondreau, p. 439). As Saint Paul shows, it is possible for the semi-autonomous passions to obey or disobey reason and will, which means that they must be controlled and developed in such a way by one’s reason and will so that they point one towards the true good. Experiencing emotions that potentially pull man in a direction away from his ultimate good serves as a chance for him to develop this mastery, hoping in time that his passions will begin to desire virtue as a consequence of his choices. For example, a married man could possibly experience passions that try to pull him away towards infidelity. Through constantly choosing not to indulge those passions and focus instead his attention on his wife, this man will not subdue his passions but will gain mastery over them in such a way that they point him to his good, namely, a loving relationship with his spouse.
This points to the other necessary role the emotions fulfill, which is aiding man in his development as a moral creature. Aquinas realizes that it is entirely possible for one to recognize and choose the good even though he does not ‘feel’ like it. Such a person would be described as a continent person, one who does the good without the affective desire to do it (Gondreau, p. 436). Returning to the fidelity example, a married man might know that it is wrong to have an affair and therefore chooses not to, even though his passions scream at him for fulfillment. Can it really be said that this man is virtuously perfect? Aquinas would answer no, for to achieve moral perfection this man would have to be oriented fully towards his ultimate good- which includes his passions. “He must be good not only in his rational judgment but in all his internal desires as well” (Gondreau, p.436). Even using a more positive example shows that the emotions are necessary in man’s development. A married man may say to his wife “I know it is right for me to love you and I choose to do so, but I don’t feel anything for you. I just know this is the right thing for both you and me”. The wife, rightly so, would be hurt and unfulfilled in her desire for love, for both her body and soul would crave that passion and love her husband was not giving. Again, this man would be continent in doing the right thing but still would not have the proper desire towards his wife. These continent men would become temperate when they use their intellect and will to engage their passions and fully desire only their wives in the properly chaste relationship of marriage. No longer is the good life burdensome to them, but they delight in it and are pulled towards it as a result of their passions. Through consistently choosing the good and forming virtuous habits of properly loving their wives, the men become more free to love and to use their passions, shaped by their actions, as a source of moral virtue. Only when they have brought their entire being, passions, will, and intellect into line with the true good, can they have achieved true beatitude. Otherwise there is something in them, in their passions that is pointing away from what is truly good.
Christ and his Passions
Based on the understandings of Thomas Aquinas the importance of the emotions to man’s development is clear. However, Scripture also reveals the significance of the emotions through the example of Jesus Christ. If the passions were indeed evils to be avoided or suppressed then Scripture would not reveal as much as it does about the emotional life of Jesus. However, this is not the case as Pinckaers points out, since in Scripture Christ “experienced sadness, joy, pain, and anger” (p. 275). He wept when Lazarus died, was hungry in the desert, suffered in the Garden of Gethsemane and was roused to anger in the temple (John 11:35, Matt 4:2-3, Mark 14:32-42, Mark 11:15-19). During none of these instances does Christ suppress the emotions he is feeling at the time. Instead, he uses the passions so that he might be “ordered to beatitude in God by the means of the virtues and gifts” (Pinckaers, p.276). Because Christ is fully man at the same time as being fully divine, he allows himself to experience all that man experiences, which includes the emotional life. Although his experience was not the same as ours in the sense that his passions never interfered with his perfect reason or the perfect grace present in him from birth, the emotions he experienced were still real and had the effect of pulling him towards God and his fellow man in love (Titus, p. 73-74, 82).
In addition, these emotions Christ experienced were necessary for his development as a person. While recognizing the fact that Christ had perfect grace and was full of virtue, this merely means that his sensate appetites were fully obedient to his reason and will (Titus, p.79). This does not mean that Christ necessarily chose when to engage his emotions, thus taking away from their spontaneity. Instead, he was able to use his emotions as they spontaneously arose to orient himself towards God and the good. When his passions were roused, they did not merely act on their own, but since Christ was a perfect union of body and soul his passions entered into dialogue with his intellect and will in expressions of love for both his Father and his brethren on earth (Titus, p. 72-73). In doing so, Christ shows to man a picture of what the emotional life should be like. The sensate appetites should not be subdued like the Stoics thought, but rather should be directed towards God, as should all of man’s appetites. Through this dialogue of his emotions and reason and will Christ, although perfect was perfect in disposition, grew in terms of his acts (Titus, p. 83). He did not progress in wisdom and grace, as he already possessed these perfectly. Instead, he grew by means of his perfect disposition in his works of grace, his ultimate work coming at the end of his life, when engaging his passion of love he sacrificed himself for all mankind.
His passions were a key component in the growth of acts that he experienced. One of the most beautiful examples of Christ experiencing passion and that intensely shines as a work of grace is the story of the garden of Gethsemane (Mark 14:32-42). Everything in him cries out to avoid the ordeal he is about to undergo as he pleads “Father, remove this cup from me” (Mark 14:36). His emotions, as they are rightly ordered, direct him to want to avoid the very real evils of torture and murder. It is not merely Christ’s body that is producing these emotions, for even his soul is sad. He expresses his emotions and because of them turns towards God in his sadness. This is the very movement from sensation to spirit that Aquinas describes (Pinckaers, p.277). Christ express sorrow and anguish, but with reason and will also engages his charity, his deep and abiding love for every human being, allowing him to undergo the trials prepared for him. Clearly, Christ does not stoically ignore his feelings. He turns to God in his anguish and focuses on his love, the passion he has for the good of every human being. Both his negative emotions (anguish), and his positive one (love), are not just expressed through the body, but instead spring from his soul. While his disposition was that of perfect grace in the garden, his emotions, working with his intellect and will to direct him in love towards God and man, allowed him to achieve a greater work than he had ever previously done, sacrificing himself for the sake of all.
The final note concerning the passions of Christ should really be concerning love, which the Church says “is the most fundamental passion… aroused by the attraction of the good” (CCC #1765). The reason for this is that the passion of love is what is at the core of all of Christ’s emotions and actions, even in the midst of suffering or anger. When in the temple, he is indignant not for his own sake but on behalf of his Father, the God who he loves (Luke: 45-46). In the garden and on the cross, it is love for all of mankind and for God that allows him to triumph in the face of tremendous personal agony and suffering. This serves to show that although passions are indeed personal desires that they are not meant to be selfish desires. The emotional life of Christ shows man that he must be called forth from himself and say ‘yes’ with his whole self to the good of God and others (Benedict XVI, n. 17). Christ, in manner of the lover in the Song of Songs, desires his beloved (every human) not only on an intellectual level but in a fashion in which all of him, passions, intellect, and will cries out and looks for the good of his beloved. His passions do not end at selfish desires, but in the true nature of God his passions point him towards the good of others, calling him outside of himself for their sake. Although there may be an “ecstasy” commonly associated with love, especially eros or passionate love, at its core the passion of love seeks the good of the other (Benedict XVI, n.6).
New Understandings
Saint Paul in a New Light
Given the example of Christ’s emotional life and the Aquinas’ understandings of the emotions, once again the focus returns to Saint Paul lamenting in frustration “I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do” (Rom 7:19). Is there indeed a war between Paul’s higher appetites and his lower ones, which seek to prevent him from obtaining true beatitude? If there is indeed a war, which is entirely possible due to the concupiscence present in human nature as a result of original sin, it is not necessarily the fault of the emotions. Rather, if one might make a claim so bold, it is because Saint Paul at the time of his letter had not achieved moral perfection. Whether it was a state of life for him at that particular moment or a trait he struggled with throughout his life, one can see a certain incontinence in the Apostle, for he clearly knows and desires to do the good but does not do it. However, if he is to follow the example of Christ and live a fully integrated life then he cannot simply subdue or push aside his emotions. Rather, using his reason and will, which seem to be oriented towards the good, he must through virtuous choices bring his passions into line so that he begins to desire what is truly good for him. As he chooses again and again with his intellect and will his true good, at the same time he must engage his passions, especially his passion of love for God his true beatitude. Developing these virtuous habits means that his passions will come into conflict with his will and intellect less and less and will instead serve them in pushing Paul towards his ultimate good.
A New Understanding in Psychology
The teachings of Aquinas on emotions and the example of Christ have not only significant implications for Saint Paul but also for man today, especially in the world of psychotherapy. First, this integrated understanding of the emotions as part of the whole man fits in with the integrated psychological model put forth by E. Christian Brugger (2009). This model has at its center a concept of human flourishing, a flourishing that must respect the fact that man is both body and soul (Brugger, p.7). Therapists who have as their goal aiding human flourishing will often have to deal with emotions in their work and cannot expect clients to leave them behind if they are to truly aid their clients in the quest for beatitude. One must realize passions do not spring from the body but are often the cry of the soul, as it desires some absent good or an evil to go away. It is impossible to separate the emotions from the cognitive processes like Descartes would desire, as the neurologist Antonio Damasio shows in revealing the brain processes that occur during emotional processing (1994, p. 137-139). In addition, based on the teachings of Aquinas and the example of Christ therapists must realize that their clients need emotions in order to make moral judgments. Again, the research of Damasio shows that higher level functions such as intelligence and memory can be intact while moral judgment is impaired as in the case of Phineas Gage, showing that the emotions are a necessary component in man’s quest to orient himself towards the good (p. 17-19, 66-67). In light of this, therapists should work with the emotional life of the client, helping them to orient themselves towards what will bring them true beatitude. Virtue and rightly formed reason and will enable the client to discern when their passions point to the good, which in turn allow them to engage their passions even more as a tool which will point them to true beatitude.
Conclusion
While the evils that confront man are indeed of a variable and multitudinous nature it is hardly fair to say that the passions are among those evils. While they can and often do cause man to act in disregard for his ultimate good as the case of Saint Paul shows, they can also serve to direct him towards that ultimate good when they entire into dialogue with man’s intellect and will. Furthermore, as Thomas Aquinas and the life of Jesus Christ show, the passions fulfill a necessary role in developing man as a moral character, developing his self-mastery, and calling him out of himself in love so that he might find his true beatitude in love of God and neighbor. In light of this, psychology today cannot afford to shun the emotions, but instead must be open to discussing them as an integral part of who man is in order to facilitate greater flourishing. Engaging the passions will ensure that man in general and a therapist’s clients in particular will be able to direct themselves towards true beatitude and walk more confidently on the path towards their ultimate goal of happiness.
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